

TOPIC GUIDES

PIMUN 2018



INTERCONNECTIVITY



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INTRODUCTION LETTERS

Welcome to you all!

What a pleasure it is for me to be, once more, part of this team and the wonderful experience that is interconnectivity.

From a fragmented world to a bipolar one, we have in over 20 years witnessed through a polarization of international relations. This challenge on top of this, solving global issues has become increasingly complicated and technical, requiring the collaboration of actors from all over the world, from all sectors, to work together. We can no longer resolve a single crisis without a coherent action that takes all issues into account together, and establishing timetables over at least the short and medium term.

The new Global Agenda to 2030, following the Millennium Development Goals, embodies this new approach to tackling global issues perfectly. Placing all actors on the same level, it requires them to work together to achieve common development goals.

The Interconnectivity system at PIMUN aims at being part of this trend. If individual independent issues can no longer be resolved individually, then the work of our institutions must be rethought. More than ever, they must work hand in hand. This will be your main mission!

Our subject is in 2024. If it is obviously prospective, it remains very realistic. The questions and problems it raises are many fold (environment, territory, military presence, resources, new trade route, telecommunications...) and we will not be able to deal with them all.

That is why your main objective is to work in interconnectivity with your country delegation (divided between the different committees) and other delegations. The ability to respect one's country's position and to promote the values of diplomacy are essential assets. However here, you will be asked to be able to listen and take into consideration what is happening in other committees to find a solution not specific to your committee, but global and sustainable to all committees!

I can only encourage you to read the entire Study Guide which is the result of long months of research and work to try to give you the best possible MUN experience. You are the main actors of this conference, and you are the only ones capable of achieving our common objectives. Work together and believe me, you will be surprised at the quality of your final work, I have no doubt. It will also be a chance for you to make incredible encounters, during debate but also during socials!

A World in Common extends its arms to us, it is up to you to seize this opportunity.

Thank you again for choosing to be part of interconnectivity, I remain at your entire disposal, please do not hesitate to ask me!

Enjoy your reading!

Victor GAONACH, ASG Interconnectivity



Welcome to all of you!

Dear delegates, you have now made a choice. Going backward is not an option anymore. After reading this Study Guide, you must understand, that you are now a part of a very narrow club.

The submarine world is not well known, and there is even fewer specialists who have linked it with the cyberspace realities. However, they have many things in common: at first, it seems they are both full of opportunities, reachable and free, but they are also opaque, undisclosed and underground. That's why they are so strategic and filled with multiple key players.


With your recently acquired knowledges, like a contemporary wizard, you have now the tools to influence this hidden world. Notwithstanding with great power comes great responsibility, and you will have to use them properly in order to protect the Arctic and its neighbors.

Be brave, we all believe in you in this quest, may your diplomatic path be successful.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas GOUDON, Backroom co-director

Background Of The Interconnectivity Topic



Source: A.B.C. Telegraphic Code 5th Edition, via <http://atlantic-cable.com/Maps/index.htm>

« When the communication networks go down, the financial sector does not grind to a halt, it snaps to a halt. »

Stephen Malphrus, Chief of Staff to Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke

Interconnectivity

Inspired by Webster MUN and implemented by MUNAPEST, we decided to bring Interconnectivity to PIMUN last year to make each edition a more dynamic and exciting experience. Interconnectivity is a systemic approach to Model UN debates, in which every event occurring in one Committee has an impact on all the others, in an effort to create a lifelike experience as accurate as that of the United Nations. The main idea is to take a general topic that can be affected by different variables and make every Committee involved in this Interconnected web. Delegates would discuss the general topic from multiple angles, which means each board will work towards a resolution of its own topic, but the debate should work towards the resolution of an overall problem that may be influenced by external events, such as treaties and posthumous agreements, as Delegates engage in a constantly updated reality whose intention is to resolve the general topic. All the documents provided by other committees, the Press Team, or by the Interconnectivity Coordinators during the conference will have the same value as real-life information. This platform of interdependence intends to set Delegates in a context on which they not only have to analyze and evaluate the topic being discussed, but they ought to simultaneously be aware of the current global panorama and contrast all of the possible outcomes that a specific situation may provide. In addition, the purpose of this scheme is to challenge individuals to engage in a realistic and demanding debate, where they do not act as isolated representatives of their respective states, but as part of a Delegation that must cooperate unilaterally. Delegates will have to balance the dynamic of their backgrounds with their delegation's interests and policies, while dealing with a constant flow of events and information; they are no longer alienated from a complex network, they help to create it!



Source: <https://wallhere.com/fr/wallpaper/202817>

Introduction

In October 1971, in the midst of the Cold War, a US nuclear-powered submarine entered Russian waters. Its mission-code name: Operation Ivy Bells. The objective was to find enemies using undersea communication cables in order to know what the Russians were up to. Each month until 1981, this tremendous operation (NAVY, CIA, NSA) worked to retrieve recordings of classified Russian Operations. Since the days of the Cold War era, underwater communication cables have been considered as both strategic and critical infrastructures.

There are more than 400 undersea optic cables in the world today. The revelation of Edward Snowden in 2012 has disclosed how British and American intelligence agencies have tapped more than 200 cables across the world. These cables carry 95% of all international communications, including Internet and telecom traffic. They span more than 1 million km and each day route a quantity of data equivalent to several hundred US Libraries of Congress. Our modern society is built around the Internet era, but the very existence of it, resides inside submarine cables.

The purpose of this conference will be to understand the challenges presented by these cables and their impact on international diplomacy. The challenges are very often unknown and secret, buried under water. Their location is strategic as well as their control. However, the area they cover does not allow them to be effectively protected. Losses and cuts (sometimes natural) regularly occur. Each time the consequences are varied and mobilize different diplomatic issues. For this reason, Interconnectivity is paramount to the proceedings regarding this issue.

Classified Information:

- Optic Cable : Nowadays, modern cable systems use fiber optics which in turn use photons to transfer data.
- How to spy on submarine cable ? : Modern tapping is based on splicing the cable and splicing the photon stream with a prism; or by simply bending the cable to a point where it begins to leak data. Users do not usually notice any disruption when this happens, except a momentary pause during the loading of a website.
- Causes of line breakage : May be a sign of someone spying on the cable, or may also be caused by a boat if it cast an anchor and pulled the submarine cable. It could also be natural, for

example, sharks feeling the electromagnetic field and attacking it. Finally it may also be affected by environmental events such as earthquakes or subzero water temperatures.

- How to locate a break ? : One way to locate the accident is using math; the distance could be measured by the time it takes to reflect a pulsing light into the fiber.
- How to repair a Cable ? : The cable must resurface with the aid of a grapnel. Then the broken section of it must be cut and replaced. But this operation could take a lot of time if the weather is not favorable for stable submarine activity.
- Strategic uses : Cable ships could also be used for oil and gas exploration with submarine drones during the landing of submarines cables.

WE ARE NOW IN 2024

Scenario

In 2024, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications transmits 15 million messages through cables to more than 8,300 banking organizations, securities institutions, and corporate customers in 195 countries. Undersea cables are a valuable commodity in the 21st century global communication environment. Over 70% of countries' international telecom traffic, which includes voice, data, and video, is carried via cables, each of which is only about the diameter of a garden hose. The demand for better connections between Tokyo and London has finally driven the construction of the first submarine fiber-optic cables to span the Arctic Ocean. High-capacity cables are planned for two routes, one through the Northwest Passage in Canadian and Alaskan waters (Arctic Fiber), the other through Russian waters (ROTACS) on the other side of the Arctic. The cables are among the world's longest, and also provide high-speed connections to communities and industries along the Arctic coast. In 2018, after intense discussions between China, Russia, Japan, Norway, the UK and other members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Nordic Council; the Russian Optical Trans-Arctic Submarine Cable System (ROTACS) project was put in place, instead of the American project, Arctic Fiber.

China had a lot of influence in this debate. These cables fit fully into the Chinese development project, the Belt and Road Initiative through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. It is also important to note that China has considerably increased its production by building a lot of Frigate of Intermediate Size for the last decade and definitely intends to be a major player in this area. The Arctic is its new playground and having this Eurasian project could improve its position to realize the Belt and Road Initiative. Nevertheless, China (unlike Russia and the USA) seeks to finance in the long term both projects, so that ROTACS and Arctic Fiber operate in the meantime.

China has expressed its will to secure the cable with Russia. As of 2017, ROTACS was mainly inspired by another project: Arctic Connect. The whole path was pretty close to ROTACS but inspired by the Finnish Minister of Transport and Communication. The project was based on the need for an international high-speed development in various sectors such as banks with High frequency transactions or e-sport with the rise of the streaming industry. As a connection between the North-East Passage and Baltic Sea cables, it was the main project to develop Smart Cities in all Scandinavian states. Finland would have an excellent opportunity to become an international traffic node. Russia and China wanted to build arctic cables with Finland. Nonetheless the project was a dead-end due to the lack of a specific knowledge by the



manufacturer on how to build super resilient high capacity polar cables. China and Russia decided to build it with the help of the Norwegian state, who already knew how to build such a cable. Indeed, they have shown a famous expertise through the Svalbard undersea cable system. These submarine twin cables were built with one of the first polar alloy metals to protect the cable at very low temperatures. Though Norway had worked on Svalbard with a British submarine cable company “Global Communication”, specialized in Polar Telecommunications, Oil & Gas and Deep Sea Research industry, the American supplier “Tyco Communication” (today renamed as TE’s Subsea Communication) company didn’t share information on the building process. After a few months of trying to reproduce this technology, The Norwegian government finally came to the conclusion that they needed American knowledge to make the Arctic Fiber project happen. The project was tabled.



Interest In The Project

The USA knows how to operate in polar environments, its collaboration with Canadian researchers has made them the most reliable manufacturer of fiber optic cables resilient to extreme cold temperatures. Nonetheless, Russia is the only power who can operate in this special area thanks to their Nuclear Icebreaker (Arktika class vessels). They used this vessel to negotiate with China their participation in the ROTACS project. Therefore, a collaborative work between all these actors is necessary to install the cable.

At first, the USA argued that they needed this kind of connection to link them to Scandinavian states. However in 2018 they already had their major suppliers busy with another project; connecting the US to Denmark and Ireland. This project was called “Havfrue”. The need to connect Scandinavia was already fulfilled for American companies, and the Arctic Fibre project wouldn’t have been as efficient as ROTACS for Russia and China. Moreover, the price for the manufacturing of the polar cables were highly dependent on manganese nodules. The USA already had a large amount of these very strategic resources (used for high value telecom components). They made a deal by asking Norway, China and Russia to trade them in order to build their submarine cable project. By far, the idea to claim strategic resources using the ROTACS project was strategic but making Russia highly dependent on the American technology was the most strategic. Moreover, the possibility to work in Russian territory, while laying the cable, is a unique opportunity to explore the location of Russian submarine resources. At the end of the negotiations, Americans agreed to build the cable for the Russian road project. That’s how ROTACS was built from 2019 to 2024 by American firms, the only ones to master polar resilient cables. The first phase of ROTACS was estimated at \$860 million and connected Kirkenes to Tokyo. The second phase, estimated at \$500 million connected Russian Arctic regions to the cable. The third phase, also estimated at \$500 million, undertaken in partnership with the Russian oil company “Transneft” develop terrestrial connections to the cable in Russia. This brings the project total to \$1.9 billion. According to Interfax, the ROTACS is mainly financed by the AIIB and the Russian oligarch Oleg Kim, already present in many sectors of the Russian economy.

However, since the decision to choose ROTACS in 2018, the USA has a larger stake in the failed building of ROTACS . Indeed, the alternate project, Arctic Fiber, could have been another huge network to develop links with Northern Europe. If ROTACS does not fulfill sufficiently its role for Asian states, the USA will take the lead (with China, who, once again, wants both project) in building another massive submarine cable, such as Arctic Fiber. Meaning Russia will have to finish the ROTACS project alone.



Russia has been spotted several times spying on European and American submarine cables in the past years. Also, ROTACS is high value for Russia as it is a vital infrastructure for the economy and the Russian Government considers it of critical interest. Although it is not Russian technology, its presence along the Russian coast justifies this policy. They logically believe that they have a right to reply with force against any cable's threat. Russia has built its development policy around ROTACS, and finally leading the installation of the cable in the northern part of the country, which will henceforth be highly dependent on submarine cables. Indeed, Northern Russian territory suffers from a lack of terrestrial cables, resulting in bad quality telecommunications. Hence, they are also more dependent to this unique cable.

China is a leading producer of submarine telecommunications technology in Asia, but did not know how to build polar resilient materials. ROTACS will help China have direct access to Europe and Scandinavia. Plus, China will be the main beneficiary of both projects. Collaborating on the project in Russian territory will help them master this technology at polar temperatures and could make them the biggest producer of submarine telecommunications in the World. Moreover, training their boats with the ability to travel amongst the frozen waters will be an asset projected to increase their domination across Europe and Scandinavia.

The Nordic Council suspects China to be using the ROTACS project to gather information on Norway's oil and gas reserves. To avoid the expansion of Chinese presence, Scandinavian states want to have more influence in the area thanks to the Arctic Council. They expect this council to finalize the Treaty in order to limit foreign military presence.

The Nordic Council also has an interest in the project because it wants access to the extension to London. On the other hand, the United Kingdom had to make a choice between accepting this Russian cable extension and having major access with the Nordic Council; or refusing due to US influence. They finally chose the former, after considering economic opportunities. Some, based on the fact that UK-USA have the reputation of being the main actors in cable tapping, are suspicious of an agreement where the United Kingdom could spy on this cable in part for the Americans.



Cables from Tokyo to Kirkenes have been operational for 5 months, but the second part, from Kirkenes to London has been delayed due to WWII submarine mines in the Norwegian Sea, which has relaunched the debate on drone assisted demining. What makes sea mines so dangerous is that they remain effective even after years under water. The fact that there are various types of mines in this area, does not allow for ship operation.

The most basic type of sea mine is detonated when a ship brushes up against the mine and triggering an explosion. In critical Russian territorial waters, so-called influence mines have been developed. These are mines with a variety of sensors that can be activated when a ship passes overhead. One of the main concerns is that some of these mines could be wired to hydrophones. This would catch the sound of a certain type of engine and immediately explode. The only way to pass through is to use anti-mine drones. But the question of autonomous drone carrying a bombing charge is very controversial and could halt the cable extension. For example, the Swedish government argues that submarine drones could be very volatile. This question divides the European community between the use of Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles (such as T-SAS) and Human guided machines. Finland declared that each drone is different, they depend on various characteristics such as how deep the cable is (USV drones), destructive or detection drones (ROV/AUV). In 2024, the miniaturization of drones also allows their use in gas and oil exploration; but they can also be used to spy on submarine cables. Few states possess the required technology to do so, yet, this possibility hinders the legalization of autonomous drones.

To this day Russia has managed to master the art of building ice submarine cable roads. Another extension to ROTACS is also being discussed with the Scandinavian States and the Baltic states in order to extend the link between terrestrial and undersea cables in the Baltic. But a major event occurred on October the 5th, 2024. **During the night, communication through the submarine North Arctic Seas internet cables (R.O.T.A.C.S) was interrupted.** Canadian engineers from “TE Subcom”, a submarine cable company, identified the cause: a section of the network, located in Russian territorial waters, has been cut. According to Russian experts from the Forum Valdaï, such an operation can only be done by state military forces. Quickly after the accident, Russia declared that the breakdown was an unclaimed attack against Russia aimed at deeply destabilizing the north of the country. Given the scarcity of equipment and personnel, it could take months for States’ infrastructure to totally recover from a large-scale, coordinated assault. Attackers wouldn’t even need to target assets, since traffic flows through other countries that serve as major hubs for the global undersea cable network. If undersea cables were cut or disrupted, even for a few hours, the capability of modern warfare that encompasses battlespace communications and awareness, protection, and the stability of the financial networks would be at risk.

Quantifying the cost to the economy when the North of Russia experiences a partial Internet blackout is difficult, and little up-to-date research is readily available.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is going to meet to tackle the issue and secure the area. The Russian emergency response has tried to redistribute the traffic but there is not enough spare capacity in the mesh. Even though Russia was still using the previous network, they do not have enough capacity to manage the entire network. Furthermore, due to terrestrial extension of ROTACS, a lot of European data seems to be corrupt. Users are starting to have substantial loss effects. The European union has condemned the lack of major backup facilities in Northern Russia and argue that these crises could have been prevented. Nevertheless, Europe has a lot more to lose if China decides to shut-down the Eurasian project. Indeed, a large group of Chinese Private Investors operates in the EU. A report produced by the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich estimated the economic impact on Switzerland of a week-long blackout to be 1.2% of their annual GDP. This estimate, however, dates back to 2005, and the figure must therefore be considered much lower than today's reality; the number of Internet users across the world has risen dramatically from approximately 900 million in 2005 to almost 4 billion today, about 50% of the world's population. Baltic states are also on the verge of taking a hit inside Cyber cities ruled by Artificial Intelligences, they are now the hub of « Digital Europe », especially Estonia which is the most developed country in R&D in Europe for years now. Having all these technologies connected, all autonomous, brings major vulnerabilities on the “Internet of Things” which implies an increasing need for ROTACS to provide effective data for Smart Cities. All across Europe, the breakdown of the ROTACS submarine Cable has created a domino effect and is undoubtedly creating difficulties in some specific sectors of the economy on the short-term as companies and banks are suffering from the loss or hard delay of terrestrial data in certain financial transfers. Fortunately, these difficulties are contained within their entities and therefore will not spill into a full scale financial crisis in Europe. However, it is now, more than ever, crucial to provide a comprehensive and effective cooperation between States in order to address international financial data transfers. Indeed, with the stakes being so high, States must work together in the creation of a multilateral treaty to address the current implications of the ROTACS submarine Cable breakdown, and to provide a framework to safeguard, and prevent risks to future financial data transfers.

Following a 2021 reform of the WTO, which was undergone in response to the 2020 trade war between many leading economies and instigated by the United States of America, the institution's mandate was broadened, and it was given stronger regulatory powers on member states. Notably, many member states and leaders believed it would be further beneficial to economic stability if the WTO's mandate was integrated to the United Nations Organization, as a consultative body of financial experts trained and



specialized in assessing the financial feasibility of multilateral projects and initiatives in various committees of the UN. The goal being to ensure the transparency and freedom of trade resulting from these projects. Within this context, the representatives of member states at the WTO regroup as a mandatory advisory body for all the concerned committees of the UN, and are tasked with overseeing the feasibility and sustainability of proposed projects that have an impact on international trade. WTO decisions are non-binding, yet their respect is necessary for efficient implementation of any project or initiative. This body may also provide non-binding advisory opinions to other entities outside the UN.

At the UN General Assembly, the issue of cable repairing responsibility has been raised by the Secretary General António Guterres. The question having first been addressed in the Security Council. He asked every concerned committee to meet up urgently and find a diplomatic solution to the crisis. The Russian government highly suspects the US. Nevertheless, even if they now, in 2024, master these technologies, they need an American support. It is still an American one produce by an American company. Cut in Russian territory, from an American company technologies, who mainly affect Europeans states ; the question of responsibility is complex. Russian government is very suspicious about sharing security protocol with Americans, Americans have started to rise the price of these technologies months ago. The Chinese government has attempted to apply pressure by threatening the Russian government to bypass their connection through Alaska if Russia didn't manage to repair ROTACS quickly enough.

Coincidentally, the Arctic Council have relaunched the Arctic Treaty negotiations to meet new challenges one week ago. The Arctic Council is a special area of law where the most influential countries at the table today are the Scandinavian countries and Canada. Yet the councils influence relies on appearance, militarily they are still outdated. Economically, the new trade route of the North (resulting from the melting of ice) is a new geo-strategic issue essential for Russia and China. For China and Russia, failing to operate in the Arctic could be seen as a failure to legitimize their power and a loss of control in the region. Nevertheless, the "technically challenging" Arctic route is becoming more feasible as polar ice recedes amid climate change. It is more viable for telecommunication companies to propose these new and innovative routes than ever before. The Arctic has entered a "new normal" of shrinking sea ice, surface water is warming, and ice is melting at the fastest pace in 1,500 years. In 2024, the Law of the Sea is still active for private actors, and the Arctic Council is more influential than ever before. The council is currently arguing about coercive measures in order to protect the Arctic from melting due to States or private actors mining in protected areas. Nuclear Ice shelter has caused a scandal during the launch of the project ROTACS when Russia have used them. China is a newcomer on the council after having asked for a seat.

Challenges To Keep In Mind

In 2024, data is gold, because private firms sell it for a profit. Most of them want to have facilities in The Arctic because of the naturally occurring subzero climate helping new Quantic Supercomputers to cool down the temperature of processors. The Arctic is becoming more and more popular, and there is already futuristic projects to build settlements there. Submarine cables are very interesting as they dynamize the region, but on the other hand, they could destroy a lot of the natural environment. The marine life is affected by submarine activity and Greenpeace is very active, well prepared, and ready to act. The case is very sensitive, and Greenpeace believes an International action to repair the submarine cable ROTACS will bring a lot of vessels and could present a risk for submarine life in the future should a conflict appear.

Moreover, the North Passage is not constantly open, due to winter ice coverage. Trying to repair this cable during this time of the year is not easy at all. There is still a lot of risks to be dealt with. Submarine cables are very unique and are highly valued by non-state actors because of the price of the materials, but also by state actors who may want to steal the cables to study and replicate the Arctic Fiber products for their own.

Finally, European and Baltic states are under fire and users have started to attack the companies hosting their lost and corrupt data. The disproportionate importance of these cables to the nation's communication infrastructure can be seen by the fact that modern optic cables are the lifeblood of the world's economy, carrying almost 100% of global Internet communication. By any standard, they constitute critical infrastructure.



Source: PIMUN Interconnectivity 2018 video, available on <http://pimun.fr/committees/interconnectivity-committees/>

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL INTRODUCTION LETTERS

Distinguished Delegates,

It is a great honor to welcome you to PIMUN 2018 and especially to the Security Council. The Security Council will be for a few days our very own space to solve global issues and try to be creative with our ideas. We hope that you are ready to use your diplomatic skills to suggest brand new ideas and find solutions to the mission the UNSC has been given. As a committee part of Interconnectivity, you will be dealing with issues at a crossroad between committees and countries.

Interconnectivity is being implemented for the second time at PIMUN, and we hope that the 2018 session will give you an opportunity to discuss new issues, but also to meet delegates from all over the world.

Interconnectivity will allow each and every one of you to challenge yourself in a new way, but most of all it will be a realistic and fun way to debate. You will be able to be in permanent contact with other delegates in different committees. This system will allow you to tackle our issue under several prisms, taking into account a broader spectrum of perspectives.

We are hoping for fruitful and enriching debates during this session. Prepare your ideas and explore new solutions. But most of all, remember that dynamism, communication and diplomatic skills are the strength of a delegate. MUNs are an excellent way to enhance diplomatic skills and develop your imagination on global topics.

Our aim as Chairs is to encourage you to do your best and to also encourage you to exchange with each other so that you enjoy this conference to the fullest. MUNs are fun moments to meet new people and experience cultural exchange. PIMUN will be a tremendous adventure in the heart of the beautiful city of Paris.

Your chairs are looking forward to discovering the measures and ideas you will be bringing to the table. We cannot wait to meet all of you and we look forward to debates and socials together.

So fellow delegates, be ready for the conference of a life-time and don't forget to enjoy every second of it!

We look forward to working with you!

Christophe BOUDIN & Tatiana BAHOUS
Chairs and contributors



Introduction To The Committee

The United Nations Security Council

The UNSC is established by Chapter III of the United Nations Charter, its main objective is to maintain international security and peace as detailed in article 24 (UN, 1945). The specific of this Committee lies in the fact that there are 10 rotating members that hold a 2 years mandate elected by the UNGA and 5 permanent countries also referred to as the P5 (China, France, The United States of America, The Russian Federation, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland). The P5 countries hold a “Veto” power as defined by article 27 (UN, 1945).

In the event that the Security Council faces a deadlock situation due to a lack of unanimity amongst the P5 and therefore fails to act as required to maintain international peace and security, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately and may issue any recommendations it deems necessary in order to restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time the General Assembly may meet using the mechanism of the emergency special session. (UN, 1950)

TOPIC: Securing The Area Against Pirates

Key Definitions And Historical Views

What is piracy

Piracy is a broad term that uncovers a large spectrum of meaning:

According to the UN

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 defines piracy in article 101 of part VII on the High Seas as following:

“Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

- a. any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
 - i. on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
 - ii. against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
- b. any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
- c. any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (i) or (ii).”

A pirate is a person who commits piracy. They are often linked with organized-crime syndicates but can also be part of small groups of individuals that make a living from piracy.

In this committee

In this context, we will consider piracy as any act of sabotage perpetrated by any actor: state or independent body. Considering the emergency of the situation, the goal will be to insure safety on short and long term, more than finding a responsible to the break.

Historical views

In the history of the UNSC the issues of piracy *stricto sensu* was raised at two occasions and was dealt differently due to the situation being different:

- Piracy in Somalia: UNSCR 2316 (2016)
- Piracy in Gulf of Guinea: UNSCR 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012)

The current situation has very little precedent, as piracy in this case could have been perpetrated by a state or any other entity. It will be up to you, as delegate of this UNSC to tackle this topic in your resolution to deal with safety in a conflicted zone. We are looking forward to seeing how you will be able to establish a strong resolution that will have an impact on the region and the different players.



The Role Of The UNSC In Interconnectivity

The aim of interconnectivity is to establish a coordinated response to global issues between committees concerned by the issue. Each committee has its own mission and its relevancy in this diplomatic crisis. The UNSC has been convoked in order to tackle the crucial issue of “Securing the zone for fixing intervention”.

In fact, the break has impacted global relationships on several levels:

- **Economically:** As this project required more than 1.9 billion \$ in total. The cables represent colossal investment for countries.
- **Politically:** The cables were built in a strategic region, where resources and claimed-territories are being disputed.
- **Diplomatically:** ROTAC's project has been the result of long and intense debates between countries materialized by the successful construction of the first part of the cable.
- **Technically:** As this project has gathered some of the most advanced technologies regarding underwater technologies in extreme areas.

Therefore, this topic covers some globally-spread crucial issues, as countries from all over the world are being impacted in a more or less direct way. In fact, this committee has made a leap into time to 2024, where international exchange and global communication can be severely hindered by such issues. The aim of the Security Council will be to coordinate a concrete response on safety to this delicate issue in strategic region.

Delegates will be expected to deal with major challenges, bearing in mind that this issue encompasses broader aspects that will be discussed in the whole interconnectivity process.

A serious break has been operated, and your mission is not to discover who nor what caused it, but to find short term and long-term solutions to deal with the fixing and safety in the region. Delegates will discuss how to deal with short term consequences, which are to say: fixing operation and safety during operation. But also, with issues in the long run in order to avoid any similar concerns in the future.



Considering the broad and intertwined aspects of this fascinating topic, delegates will be asked to focus on three aspects in order to drive their discussions into a final resolution:

First: Who will be in charge of fixing the cable considering the complexity of the issue.

Second: How to secure the region while the fixing is being operated

Finally: Ensuring that such cases of “cable break” whether it is a consequence of conflict of interest between states or piracy, will be avoided in the future




Discussion Of The Topic

1) Who will be in charge of fixing the cable ?

As you can see in the map below, 2024 is the era of underwater interconnection. Cables are running under the oceans and are essential devices to insure smooth and flowing exchanges world-wide. Cables are central in the current process of globalization, and the break could highly endanger connections and provoke serious loss of information.

The delicacy of this concern is to be taken cautiously, as this break could be the source of serious conflicts of interest. The UNSC will have to address the issue of cable repair taking into account the economic, but also technical and geopolitical angles.

Figure 1 : Submarine Cable connections



Source: <http://ookawa-corp.over-blog.com/2017/01/global-internet-map/submarine-cable-map-2016.html>



a) Actors in charge

The prime issue that needs to be brought to the table is linked to actors that could monitor the fixing. ROTAC's project is the result of a strong cooperation between states, *institutions and the private sector*. Each actor has contributed skills and expertise for the completion of this project.

Considering this multi-dimensional aspect, this issue requires a cooperative answer in order to monitor the repair operation. The UNSC will have to deal with the selection of actors and the allocation of their tasks during the whole process.

Actors that could be called upon for a fixing operation

- States: in order to provide technical knowledge
- UN bodies:
 - The Arctic council: to provide supervision
 - The IMB: The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is a specialized department of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The IMB fights crimes related to maritime trade and transportation, particularly piracy and commercial fraud, and in protecting the crews of ocean-going vessels; it is endorsed by the UN's International Maritime Organization (IMO)
 - The IMO: The IMO 's primary purpose is to develop and maintain a comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping and its remit today includes safety, environmental concerns, legal matters, technical co-operation, maritime security and the efficiency of shipping.
- The private sector
- NGOs

b) The economic aspect

The UNSC will have to broadly discuss the economic aspect of this mission. Delegates are encouraged to lead a tight work with their fellow colleagues in the WTO in order solve financial issues and budget inquiries required to monitor the fixing of the cables.

Interconnectivity enables delegate to tackle the budget question thanks to the work of the WTO. Delegate will have to bear in mind that funds need to be allocated for the fixing. Therefore, a broad scheme of budget allocation needs to be tackled in cooperation with the WTO that will lead decisions regarding this issue.

c) Technical

In order to insure an operational fixing mission, delegates will have to take into account the knowledge and skills needed in order to monitor such operations.

The UNSC will have to address the question of “Who will be in charge of the fixing”, according to the ability and amount of knowledge each country can bring. In fact, the location of the break is located in a hardly accessible zone and only few countries such as the USA, or Canada can provide the expertise needed for this operation. This dimension is still a question of cooperation, as knowledge mastering and materials can be also provided by experts from other countries or sectors.

d) Geopolitics

Finally, this crucial issue needs to be considered under the line of conflicting national interests. Delegates will have to remember that the repair operation takes place in a highly strategic region and may result in disputes.

2) Short term safety: securing the zone during reparation intervention

Once delegates are done considering the issue of “responsibility to repair”, the UNSC will have to deal with the core issue of safety. The reason for the break should not be discussed in committee, thus ways to avoid it need to be set. The break could have been perpetrated by military state actors, pirates or else. Therefore, the UNSC will have to ensure that the area is safe enough for repair. This considering that the zone, as well as being at a crossroad of interest, is still highly contaminated by mines. Delegates, are encouraged to take advice from the DISEC in order to be fully aware of the situation before making decision.

Delegates are expected to find short term military and diplomatic measures to secure the zone during the fixing operation. The goal of this committee being safety against any attempt of piracy.

Bodies that could help secure the zone during operation


- State military forces
- UN bodies
- NATO
- DISEC

3) Long term safety against attempts of piracy

The last angle that needs to be tackled is the long-term safety in the region from a military angle. The UNSC has for mission to ensure long lasting stability and security on a military level. Considering the delicacy of the location, and the emergency of the issue, delegates have to be aware that long term solutions are necessary to insure safety in a zone under perpetual dispute.

As you can see it on the map below, over the past years, there have been military encounters in the region both in the air and sea. For instance, Russia, has been violating national airspace of neighboring countries and violating international treaties in the region. Tensions are fired regularly in the area causing military instability and interests conflicts.

Figure 2 : Tensions in the region



Delegates in the UNSC will have to consider these interest discrepancies in order to establish concrete measures on safety to secure the area. The task of the council will be to find military solutions to secure the area against any type of piracy by:

- States: interests discrepancies or sabotage
- Piracy: any state-independent body attempting sabotage or physical destruction of the cables

Delegate will be pushed to cooperate with the Arctic council to coordinate military safety with diplomatic measures pursued in treaties. Military solutions will need to be given to ensure stability in the region and avoid similar situations in a zone undergoing severe tensions between actors.

Questions That Need To Be Tackled In Addressing The Issue

The following questions and ideas will help you structure your debate and achieve a powerful resolution. Delegates are expected to use the rule of interconnectivity to enrich their resolution and tackle the topic of safety under several angles.

- Who should be called to fix the break, considering the following dimensions?
 - Economic
 - Technical and material
 - Geopolitical
- How should the location be secured militarily?
 - Implementation of a peacekeeping mission
 - Where will the force come from?
 - Who will be in charge to monitor them?
 - Who will be in charge to oversee the project?
- The implementation of a peacekeeping mission
- Provide the mandate for an International Maritime Task-Force which would jointly coordinate actions in the region and effectively control the waters.
 - This would have to be a short-term solution and thus should ideally run with a mandate that would have to be renewed annually
 - Approval and permission by all relevant states would have to be sought, as none of the states involved could be considered wholly a failed state
 - Mechanisms for when alleged perpetrators are apprehended • Limits would have to be discussed
 - Concordance with international law would have to be ascertained
- Refer to the International Maritime Organization to increase coordination and monitoring efforts to evaluate the situation further.
 - Is that a viable option?
 - Will it resolve matters?
 - But if we have an information shortage, perhaps it's what needs to be done?

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WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION INTRODUCTION LETTERS

Welcome delegates!

This is the second time interconnectivity has ever been run at PIMUN, and you, as delegates, will find it extremely challenging and rewarding. The WTO is a unique committee which combines elements of General Assembly rules of procedure added to a more technical and innovative approach to maximize interactivity and learning. Our goal, which we have strived to achieve throughout our individual MUN careers and now together, is to continue thinking outside the box and working hard to ensure that our conferences are the best platform we can create to enhance your personal skills, as well as make you more of a global citizen.

As such, we have taken this opportunity to form this special committee, that will be at the crossroads of a platform for negotiation and financial consulting, in order to bring it even closer to the values we believe are at the core of MUN and why you keep returning: continuous education, diplomacy, and empathy and interpersonal skills.

The delegates in this committee will be performing the functions of economic diplomats as closely as possible. In practice, in a regular committee, one can exercise a very large scope over one's national policy even as one is only supposed to be an ambassador of that country. However, here, as a delegate you will be directing economic national policy in cooperation with the other members of your delegation. In this special committee you will have to learn to adapt, innovate and provide a critical financial feedback to other committees within the constraints of interconnectivity as real diplomats do.

Diplomats must be able to communicate clearly and effectively, and we believe that diplomatic skills are one aspect that MUNs help the most to develop and reinforce. We will be using a special set of Rules of Procedure to allow for freer negotiating sessions, enabling longer unmoderated caucuses and ensuring that standard procedure is cut down to the minimum. It will be a demanding and fulfilling few days.

We are extremely grateful for those of you who have chosen to delegate in this committee and look forward to the impassioned and enriching debates to come!

Annelise BARRE & Annelaure BALDACCHINO
Chairs and contributors



Introduction To The Committee

The World Trade Organization

The WTO was born out of negotiations, and everything the WTO does is the result of negotiations. The majority of the WTO's current work comes from the 1986-1994 negotiations called the Uruguay Round and earlier negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO is currently the host to new negotiations, under the “Doha Development Agenda” launched in 2001. The organization has three essential purposes: it is an organization for liberalizing trade, a forum for governments to negotiate trade agreements and a place for them to settle trade disputes.

The agreements which constitute the heart of the WTO are negotiated and signed by the majority of the world's trading nations. They provide the legal ground-rules for international commerce. These documents are essentially contracts, binding governments to keep their trade policies within agreed limits. Although negotiated and signed by governments, the goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their business, while allowing governments to meet social and environmental objectives. These rules need to be transparent and justifiable. During the conference, this committee will mainly focus on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Among the WTO agreements, the GATS is the only agreement that regulates both transfers and payment for services transactions as well as pure capital movements. It provides a regulatory platform on which countries can exchange and commit to mutual market access concessions for the supply of services (four modes of supply: cross-border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence, and presence of natural persons). More specifically, the regulatory regime adopted by the GATS envisages capital flows in the form of current payment and transfers required to perform a services transaction, as well as pure capital movements as a necessary element to most of financial services trades¹.

For the purposes of interconnectivity, this committee will take the form of informal meetings that are often held in the WTO. The committee will therefore mainly consist of consultations of the whole and unmoderated caucuses. Since decisions are made by consensus, without voting, informal consultations within the WTO play a vital role in allowing consensus to be reached between a vastly diverse membership, but they do not appear in organization charts, precisely because they are informal. Indeed,

¹ Federico Lupo Pasini, *The International Regulatory Regime on Capital Flows and Trade in Services*, (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council), <https://www.pecc.org/resources/trade-and-investment-1/1701-the-international-regulatory-regime-on-capital-flows-and-trade-in-services-paper/file>, 2



breakthroughs are rarely made in formal meetings, least of all in the higher-level councils. Some informal meetings still include full membership (164 members since July 29th, 2016) such as those of the Heads of Delegations. However, for difficult issues, like the one at hand, smaller groups have become the common practice. Often, the chairperson of a negotiating group attempts to forge a compromise by holding consultations with groups of 20-40 of the most interested delegations. The negotiating group at hand is the ROTACS project group, that is to say all the countries using or planning to use the cable as well as those which have economic, territorial and political interests linked to the ROTACS project. In order to forge a compromise on financial data transfer protection in the ongoing crisis the chairperson of the ROTACS project negotiation group has chosen to hold a consultation with a selected group of states which are directly affected by the crisis. This committee is the consultation table. The consultation has to be handled sensitively: to ensure that the process is transparent (everyone is kept informed about what is going on) and inclusive (countries not in a particular consultation or meeting have an opportunity to participate or provide input). This means that all countries represented in interconnectivity and member of the WTO need to be informed of the negotiations and that any country not represented in this committee but present in another committee of interconnectivity can participate indirectly to the debate.

The final outcome will be a multilateral treaty which will be the result of numerous bilateral, informal bargaining sessions, which depend on individual countries' interests. This means that the treaty can be composed of general clauses mandatory to all states taking part in the treaty as well as specific clauses corresponding to a commitment between two or three countries (For example: China, the USA and Russia). Additionally, as for any standard treaty countries can make reservations and declarations (<https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/training/regional/2009/13-17October-2009/reservations-declarations.ppt>.) The former are extremely useful as they enable states to participate in a treaty in which they would not be able to participate to otherwise due to an unacceptable provision or provision. The art of achieving agreement among all WTO members is to strike an appropriate balance, so that a breakthrough achieved among only a few countries can be acceptable to the rest of the membership. Therefore, this committee aims at providing you with this rare and exciting experience of informal negotiations which are a prior necessity to any WTO agreement because it is where most of the work is actually done.



As economic diplomats you will have two missions in this committee and one mission for your delegation.

In the WTO you will have to:

1. Create a Multilateral Treaty on Preventing and Addressing International Financial Data
2. Provide financial expertise to each Intercon committee. This mission is the core of interconnectivity because it enables the coordination of different committees and is key to forging a common response to the crisis. As financial experts, you are the ones who will determine the feasibility of projects proposed by other committees. Indeed, any solution/project which requires funding needs our committee's endorsement in order to pass and be carried out, it is a mandatory prerequisite.

As economic experts of your delegation you will be responsible for your delegation's budget as a treasurer. Individual states (delegations) may allocate funds from their national budget to certain projects to compensate a lack of UN funds. Delegations can also give funding to other countries directly through bilateral agreements if need be. This mission will be outside the mandate of our committee but it will provide delegations with more bargaining power and flexibility to carry out projects/solutions outside the box, meaning, that do not correspond to any interconnectivity committee prerogative, that can help resolve the crisis.

The articulation of these missions will be further detailed in the rules of procedure.



TOPIC: Multilateral Treaty on Preventing and Addressing International Financial Data

Exploration Of The Topic

The possibility of transmitting confidential information, to conduct financial transactions and to communicate internationally, all depends upon a global network of physical cables lying under the sea. Composed of more than half a million miles of fibre-optics, this network is an indispensable infrastructure of our century that few realize its existence. However, we have now developed an increased dependency upon this system of transfer, and security remains a challenge. Funnelled through exposed choke points (often with minimal protection) and their isolated deep-sea locations, which are entirely public, arteries upon which the Internet and our modern world depends have been left highly vulnerable. Whether from terrorist activity or an increasingly threatening state naval presence, the threat of these vulnerabilities being exploited is growing. A successful attack, as we have recently undergone, would deal a crippling blow to every state and individual's financial security and prosperity. Working with global partners on addressing International Financial Data Transfer security, and preventing future data transfer vulnerabilities is crucial, now more than ever. In acting now to protect against these dangers, ensuring that our century's greatest innovation does not also become its undoing.

Introduction To International Financial Data Transfers

Tools and Processes:

Most international transfers are executed through SWIFT, a co-operative society founded in 1974 by seven international banks, with its' headquarters are in La Hulpe, Belgium. This institution operates a global network to facilitate the transfer of financial messages. Using these messages, banks can exchange data for the transfer of funds between financial institutions. The society also acts as a United Nations–sanctioned international standards body for the creation and maintenance of financial-messaging standards.

Specifically in regard to bank-to-bank wire transfers, each account holder must have a proven identity. Chargebacks are unlikely, although wires can be recalled. Information contained in wires are transmitted securely through encrypted communications methods. The price of bank wire transfers varies greatly, depending on the bank and its location.

Regulations relating to data flow and data processing have become a key issue for the financial services industry in recent years. At least three different kinds of measures need to be distinguished, those being the following:

- Restrictions on the ability of firms to send data outside the country in which it is collected for processing or analysis;
- Requirements that foreign financial services firms use local servers or other computing facilities in the conduct of their business;
- Requirements that those providing certain financial and other services provide access to the source code of software used to provide the service.

International Financial data transfers are vulnerable to security threats in that they pass through a variety of different bodies and actors. In the financial services sector, “Self-regulatory bodies” include professional associations, securities exchanges, futures exchanges, national stock exchanges and clearing agencies. Any regulation should aim at increasing and improving accountability of these self-

regulatory bodies in regard to personal data protection and privacy, while encouraging free-flowing data necessary to economic growth today².

Approaches to Privacy and Personal data protection:

It must be noted that the International Financial Data market is expanding and liberalizing itself, in order to permit more free-transfers between regions and states. This poses a logistical risk in regards to confidential and private financial information and data. Faced with this problem, some states have proposed the idea of providing an exception from data transfer obligations in respect of measures to protect privacy and personal data. On another hand, some EU FTAs have opted for a *positive obligation* on parties to adopt adequate safeguards to the protection of privacy instead. Notably the European Parliament has expressed its strong interest in protecting confidential data and personal privacy in the context its' trade negotiations. Therefore, it is interesting to highlight these two different approaches to this security requirement in financial data transfers.

Regulatory Cooperation:

Faced with this growing integration and interconnectedness between states in regions in matters of financial data transfers, regulatory cooperation is more than ever crucial.

The EU has experimented with new institutional mechanisms for regulatory cooperation in a number of the trade agreements it is negotiating or has recently concluded. The CETA, for example, establishes a Financial Services Committee, tasked in part with carrying out a dialogue on the regulation of the financial services sector with a view to improving mutual knowledge of the respective regulatory systems and to cooperate in the development of international standards. According to the agreement, this dialogue is to be based on the principles and prudential standards agreed at multilateral level.

² Nigel Cory ; Robert D. Atkinson, *Financial Data Does Not Need or Deserve Special Treatment in Trade Agreements*, April 2016, <http://www2.itif.org/2016-financial-data-trade-deals.pdf>

From an international regulatory perspective the flow of capital and foreign currency is essentially regulated by four sets of instruments³:

1. IMF regulation: The Articles of the Agreements of the International Monetary Fund (the IMF Articles) aims to ensure financial and monetary stability and it prescribes stringent rules on payment and transfers for current international transactions, while leaving a wider room for discretion for capital account transactions.
2. Multilateral and preferential agreements on services, such as the GATS and various FTAs regulate current payment and transfers, as well as the capital movements to the extent that are incidental to the freedom of trade in services.
3. International Investment Agreements / Bilateral Investment Treaties: look at capital flows as one of the collateral conditions necessary for ensuring freedom of investment
4. Regional treaties: such as the European Union, which require freedom of movement of capital as one of “four freedoms” of the single market.

For the purposes of this committee, we will be focusing on the creation of a multilateral treaty on capital and financial data movements across borders (point 2). In this context, increasing the security of financial flows can be envisioned as trade restrictions, but also as further cooperation in and creation of international bodies charged with monitoring financial data trade between nations.

³ Federico Lupo Pasini, *The International Regulatory Regime on Capital Flows and Trade in Services*, (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council), <https://www.pecc.org/resources/trade-and-investment-1/1701-the-international-regulatory-regime-on-capital-flows-and-trade-in-services-paper/file>, 2

The Growing Importance of Undersea Cables in International Financial Transfers

Today, up to 95% of global communications are still transmitted via cables lying deep beneath the oceans. Our world's submarine network comprises an estimated 213 independent cable systems and 545,018 miles of fiber, and there is no alternative to using these undersea cables. Satellite technology cannot effectively handle the communications requirements of the modern digital economy and society. Moreover, in a single day, these cables carry some \$10 trillion of financial transfers and process some 15 million financial transactions. It is therefore crucial to consider this perpetual state of insecurity when moving forward in addressing legislation, which further promotes international financial trade⁴.

⁴ Rishi Sunak MP, "Undersea Cables Indispensable, Insecure", *Policy Exchange*, <https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Undersea-Cables.pdf>, 5

Questions That Need To Be Tackled In Addressing The Issue

Within the context of this committee, we may also establish influential new and consolidated texts on such matters as data transfer, forced localisation, source code, regulatory transparency, and domestic regulation.

The main mission of this committee will be to create a multilateral treaty which will set out a framework of general rules and disciplines generally applicable to all sectors in which Members have agreed to undertake commitments. It will also include certain institutional provisions, including dispute settlement.

This multilateral agreement should establish specific rules against data localization, promote government transparency, create better cooperation for legitimate government data requests, and limit unnecessary access to data on foreign citizens⁵.

- What regulations can we put in place to promote international data transfers?
- How can we guarantee transfer security?
- Should national legislation and safeguards take priority over international organizations in the regulation of financial trade security?
- How much do Peacekeeping Operations cost and what factors play into their cost?
- How is it possible to reduce the costs of many of the UN's missions to be more financially efficient?

⁵ Nigel Cory ; Robert D. Atkinson, *Financial Data Does Not Need or Deserve Special Treatment in Trade Agreements*, April 2016, <http://www2.itif.org/2016-financial-data-trade-deals.pdf>

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INTRODUCTION LETTERS

Distinguished Delegates,

It's more than a pleasure for us to welcome you to PIMUN 2018, and more specifically to the Emergency Summit. As Chairs, we are looking forward for you to have an authentic delegate experience. We hope to see high level committee work, but we will also encourage you to get to know each other and spend some fun time.

The world we live in today is highly interconnected and complex, and it offers challenges to people, societies and leaders that were unthinkable a few decades ago. Living in the globalized era offers new opportunities but also challenges and threats. Some of these challenges will be addressed within the work of our committee. We hope this experience allows you to understand how difficult it is to offer a global response to an international crisis, but we also believe that it can help you to learn how to provide solutions to complex problems.

Remember that as Chairs, we are here to provide you guidance, but the conference is up to you. We are true believers of the role of the United Nations and its agencies in such a complex and globalized world, and by sharing that belief with you we hope you make it yours and engage with other problems in the future that might require potential leaders like you. Please remember that you are here to solve problems, not to make them, and to work together, not against each other.

We are sure that the Emergency Summit will be an extremely exciting committee, especially if you are keen on international security and cooperation. So, get ready for four intense days where we hope to be able to see the best version of yourself. We are eager to make this year's conference a unique and memorable experience for all of you.

We are looking forward to working with you!

Kamilla BÉRES & Eduardo GONZÁLEZ
Chairs and contributors

Introduction To The Committee

The Emergency Summit of the General Assembly

An “emergency special session” is an unscheduled meeting of the United Nations General Assembly to make urgent recommendations on a particular issue. They are typically rare – which is reflected by the fact that they occurred only 10 times in the whole history of the United Nations⁶. Most emergency special sessions run for a single "meeting", which itself can run over a number of days – the Tenth, however, is the only emergency special session to be resumed more than once (the Seventh emergency special session of the United Nations General Assembly was resumed once), meaning that that Session has spanned across a number of "meetings".

Under the resolution 377A(V), "Uniting for peace", adopted by the General Assembly on 3 November 1950, an emergency special session can be convened within 24 hours:

"Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations".

In the case of PIMUN 2018, the Emergency Summit of the General Assembly of the United Nations was called upon to have an extraordinary meeting by Secretary-General António Guterres, in order to come up with a solution to the current telecommunication crisis in the Arctic region.

⁶ <https://www.un.org/ga/sessions/emergency.shtml>



TOPIC: Coordinated Response And Liability To The Restoration of Telecommunication In The Arctic Region

Requested Response To The Crisis Event

The topic of the Emergency Summit of the UN General Assembly is “**Coordinated response and liability to the restoration of telecommunication in the Arctic region**”. A section of the major submarine North Arctic Seas internet cables [Russian Optical Trans-Arctic Cable System (ROTACS)] has been cut off in Russian territorial waters, which unclaimed attack could have been perpetrated by state military forces according to experts. During the committee sessions, delegates should make efforts to find out which country is responsible for the crisis as well as to propose measures to prevent similar incidents in the region.

Questions That Need To Be Tackled In Addressing The Issue

Represented countries are expected to find a common response to the current crisis event, aimed at resolving the crisis via diplomatic tools, addressing the responsibility of the crisis event, and coming up with possible alternatives to restore telecommunication networks of the Arctic region as soon as possible. Besides working on a possible resolution, delegates are expected to closely cooperate with their fellow representatives in the United Nations Security Council, Arctic Council, World Trade Organization and Disarmament Commission and follow the interconnected chain of events.

Even though the crisis scenario is built upon an imaginary (but realistic) turn of the events, delegates are expected to take the crisis scenario seriously and act like real diplomats would react in the outlined framework. Among others, Model United Nations is aimed at developing the problem-solving skills of delegates and the ability to react to unexpected events besides already existing conflicts.

Sources

- <https://www.un.org/ga/sessions/emergency.shtml>
- Emergency Special Sessions - <http://www.un.org/en/ga/sessions/emergency.shtml>
- ROTACS - <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/sea-cables-thawing-arctic>



INTRODUCTION LETTERS

Dear Delegates,

It is a pleasure to welcome you to the Arctic Council Committee!

Our names are Camille and Florian, we are both French and currently studying at Pantheon-Sorbonne respectively in L2 in law and Master 1 in Political Science. This is our first time chairing at PIMUN and we look forward to this conference as it is the first time PIMUN will run this special committee, the Arctic Council, integrated within the interconnectivity committees.

This Arctic Council is charged with a specific task which is helping the establishment of a treaty regarding the Arctic Ocean.

We hope the study guide will be a useful base for your research, especially regarding the understanding of the international challenges of this area and the importance to set proper international regulation on the matter. Do not hesitate to contact us if you have any query.

See you all in May,

Camille VILLENEUVE & Florian GUIDAT
Chairs and contributors



Introduction To The Committee

The Arctic Council

- What is the Arctic Council?

In 1996, the Ottawa Declaration formally established the Arctic Council as a high-level intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues; issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic⁷.

- Who are the members of the Arctic Council?

The Arctic Council consists of the eight Arctic States: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States.

The Arctic Council also includes 6 permanent participants: the Aleut International Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich'in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North and the Saami Council. These six organizations represent Arctic indigenous peoples and this category of Permanent Participant was created to provide for active participation and full consultation with the Arctic indigenous peoples within the Council.

Also there is an observer status in the Arctic Council, which is open to: non-arctic states, inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, global and regional and non-governmental organizations. Currently, 13 non-arctic states, 13 inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, and 13 global and regional and non-governmental organizations have been approved as observers to the Arctic Council⁸.

At PIMUN 2018, only states (not the EU) will be present within the committee and not just the 8 official member-states of the Arctic Council, but all status of members.

⁷ History of the Arctic Council: <http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council>

⁸ Arctic Council observers: <http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers>



- What is the role of the Arctic Council?

The work of the Council is primarily carried out in 6 Working Groups. They are composed of representatives at expert level from sectoral ministries, government agencies and researchers. Their work covers a broad field of subjects, from climate change to emergency response. The 6 working groups are: the Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP), the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG)⁹.

The Council may also establish Task Forces or Expert Groups to carry out specific work. The Task Forces are appointed at the Ministerial meetings to work on specific issues for a limited amount of time. The Task Forces are active until they have produced the desired results, at which point they become inactive¹⁰.

⁹ Arctic Council task forces: <http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/subsidiary-bodies/task-forces>

¹⁰ Arctic Council working groups: <http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups>



TOPIC: Negotiating The Arctic Treaty

Presentation

Unlike the Antarctic, the Arctic Ocean is not ruled by any treaty from the Arctic Council. The objective of this committee will be therefore to create a treaty which will include the points described in the next section, in the context of the crisis that will be simulated in 2024.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is currently the only document which helps to legislate the Arctic. One article of UNCLOS, the article 234, concerns specifically ice-covered areas and stipulates that *“Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence.”*

Another point of comparison is the Antarctic Treaty as the Antarctic and the Arctic are confronted to numerous similar issues on the environment for instance. The main objective of the Antarctic Treaty is to preserve the utilization of the Antarctic *“for peaceful purposes only; military activity, such as weapons testing, is prohibited but military personnel and equipment may be used for scientific research or any other peaceful purpose”* according to the Article 1 of this treaty¹¹.

The objective of this committee is not to write a treaty but a resolution which will give some points of reflection about a possible Arctic Treaty by solving some issues described below.

¹¹ The Antarctic Treaty http://www.ats.aq/e/ats_governance.htm; https://www.ats.aq/documents/ats/treaty_original.pdf

Questions That Need To Be Tackled In Addressing The Issue

From a Geopolitical stance

- How should the resolution suggest dealing with the current territorial claims?

Due to its strategic position, many arctic territories are currently disputed. An example is the Hans Island disputed between Denmark, on behalf of Greenland, and Canada. Both flags have been raised numerous times on this island but the dispute has remained unresolved since 1973¹².

Another atypical situation is the Arctic Archipelago of Svalbard, a Norwegian territory that has the status of entirely visa-free zone under the terms of the Svalbard Treaty in 1920¹³. The signatories were given equal rights to engage in commercial activities (mainly coal mining) on the islands. As of 2012, Norway and Russia are making use of this right and until the 1990s, the Russian population was bigger than the Norwegian one on these islands.

These are not the only disputes and tensions regarding territorial claims in the Arctic and the UNCLOS tries to resolve some of the issue but new solutions need to be found to resolve the current situation.

- How should the right of access to the Arctic Ocean be regulated?

The access to this strategic zone is key and, therefore, the resolution should determine which actors (nations-states, private companies, international organizations, NGOs, etc.) can access this water and the purpose of its access (maritime route, searches, etc) in order to avoid any future diplomatic incident such as the one delegates are dealing with as well as limiting the impact of human presence in this specific natural area.

From an economic stance

- How should the resolution regulate the exploitation of resources in the area?

The United States Geological Survey estimates that 22% of the world's oil and natural gas could be located beneath the Arctic. Let's not forget that the Arctic is also a huge reserve of freshwater and the exploitation of this aquiferous resource will be an enormous strategic challenge in the next decade.

¹² Hans Island territorial dispute: <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/hans-island-boundary-dispute-canada-denmark-territorial-conflict.html>

¹³ Svalbard Treaty:
<https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-0269.pdf>



Therefore, the Arctic is a key strategic area but an intensive exploitation could cause damages on the environment

- Should a commercial maritime route be established?

During summer, with melting ice, and thanks to new technology, such as icebreaker boats, an almost permanent maritime route is plausible. It would be a serious gain of time and a strategic advantage¹⁴ but at the same time a danger for the environment.

From an environmental stance

- Should the final document ensure the protection of the environment, including the management of the living resources and protection of animal species?

The potential exploitation of this Ocean may harm the existing fauna and flora, as it is a key element for the Arctic Council and this aspect should be considered.

- How to preserve freshwater resources?

Freshwater resources can be exploited, and they will last a long time but they should also be protected from an intensive exploitation of the Arctic not avoid any contamination and remained them drinkable.

From a legal stance

- Which status shall be given to this atypical ocean?

This ocean is extremely specific as it is a solid ocean, but breakable and full of resources. Therefore a specific status should be written within the future Arctic Treaty to preserve this ocean.

- Should the resolution include liability provisions in case of future accidents like the one discussed during the conference?

The incident described in the study guide requires a quick intervention and this committee should determine which actor(s) will be in charge of repairing the cable in the event of a similar incident in the future. Furthermore, a possible Arctic Treaty should try to avoid any future incident by tackling issues regarding military intervention in the Arctic Ocean.

¹⁴ The strategic importance of a commercial route route:
<https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/rival-claims-to-the-changing-arctic#gs.8sZEL8Q>

Sources

- History of the Arctic Council: <http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council>
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- The Antarctic Treaty http://www.ats.aq/e/ats_governance.htm;
- Hans Island territorial dispute: <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/hans-island-boundary-dispute-canada-denmark-territorial-conflict.html>
- Svalbard Treaty: <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-0269.pdf>
- The strategic importance of a commercial route route: <https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/rival-claims-to-the-changing-arctic#gs.8sZEL8Q>



INTRODUCTION LETTERS

Distinguished delegates,

It is more than a pleasure for us to welcome you to PIMUN 2018 and more specifically to our Committee, the Disarmament Commission. We also congratulate you for being part of this great experience, we hope it will be unforgettable for all. Based on our experience in previous MUNs, we can assure you that any outstanding participation is the result of intense research and work, essential in public speaking and diplomacy. It is for this reason that, as the Dais, we recommend that you read this Study Guide that we have prepared with the intention of serving as a reference for your further research in relation to the policies of your countries, as well as for the preparation of the Position Papers.

As your Chairs, we wish to see you have fun both during the committee and on the dance floor during our social events.

We sincerely hope that PIMUN will permit you to broaden your knowledge on international relations and the world of diplomacy, but above all, provides you with lasting friendships and unforgettable moments. We remain at your complete disposal both via email and by Facebook to resolve any questions that may arise in relation to the Study Guide or the Position Papers.

We look forward to meeting you in May. In the meantime, we assure you our kindest regards,

Joseph LEE & Valentin HOYEZ
Chairs and contributors



Introduction To The Committee

The Disarmament Commission Of The General Assembly

The Disarmament Commission is an extension of the DISEC committee and will function in the same way for this Interconnectivity Session¹⁵.

This committee deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that may affect the International community. To do so it seeks out solutions through resolutions in accordance with the international security regime.

According to the United Nations, *"It considers all disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any other organ of the United Nations; the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; promotion of cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels of armaments."*

This committee also works alongside the United Nations Disarmament Commission¹⁶ and the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament¹⁷. It is the only Main Committee of the General Assembly entitled to verbatim records coverage pursuant to Rule 58 (a) of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly¹⁸.

You will find thanks to the following link an access to the UNODA: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/update/discussing-drones-at-the-un-headquarters-2/>

¹⁵ United Nations, 2018. *UN General Assembly - First Committee - Disarmament and International Security*.

¹⁶ www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/DisarmamentCommission/UNDiscom.shtml

¹⁷ www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/BF18ABFEFE5D344DC1256F3100311CE9?OpenDocument

¹⁸ www.un.org/en/ga/about/ropga/recds.shtml



TOPIC: Mine Clearance In The North Sea Barrage

Presentation Of The Situation And Key Problems

As stated previously, the cable needs to pass by the North Sea in order to deliver information to Norway and Europe. However, this region is known for being an underwater minefield. These zones need to be cleaned up to guarantee any perspective developments and extension for this cable as well as to ensure that the cable maintenance is of no risk to the teams leading the mission. Furthermore, the mines pose a threat to the population, all types of activities that take place in the region and all construction projects and in particular pipelines.

This poses a direct challenge concerning the extension of ROTACS from Kirkenes to London.

These are the points that need to be taken into consideration:

1. Geographic localization
2. Technology involved
3. How missions are led
4. UN Involvement

Point That Need To Be Taken In Consideration

1. Geographic localization

Indeed, the **North Sea Mine Barrage** is a minefield laid near the Orkney Islands¹⁹ in Norway by the United States Navy²⁰ (assisted by the Royal Navy²¹) during World War I²² and the zone from **Eckernförde, in the northern German State of Schleswig-Holstein to the Danish Island of Bornholm** totals more than **100 of underwater mines and bombs** along with shell graveyards scattered along all of northern Germany's coastlines. There are also apparently **5,000 metric tons of shells filled with substances** such as phosgene and the nerve agent tabun in the Little Belt, the strait between the Danish Island of Funen and the Jutland Peninsula²³.

The North Sea



Source: <https://www.alamy.com/stock-photo-map-showing-the-naval-bases-of-the-north-sea-during-world-war-one-79829270.html>

¹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orkney_Islands

²⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Navy

²¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Navy

²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I

²³ Worldwar1.com, 2000. *The North Sea Mine Barrage*. En.wikipedia.org, 2006. *North Sea Mine Barrage*.



The zone that extends from Northern Germany to Denmark is a wide passage and required a minefield 250 miles long and 900 feet deep. The main problem is establishing an exact number of mines in the region and localizing them on the map to lead an effective clean up mission.

It appears that this is one the committees main objectives: establishing a clear diagram of the region and identifying key spots that could pose a threat to the cable.

2. Technology involved

Firstly, there is a need to take in consideration that we are dealing with Naval mines and that they differ from other types of mines and depth charges. Sea-mines are amongst the oldest, cheapest and most dangerous anti-access/area denial weapons. They can be used as offensive weapons as well as defensive.

The mines found in these regions are mostly **MARK 6 MINES**: The Mk 6 mine is a 34 inch or 86 cm diameter steel sphere containing a buoyancy chamber and 300 lb or 140 kg of TNT. These mines are designed to be ineffective if not under 7,6 m of depth (25 pi)²⁴.

²⁴ En.wikipedia.org, 2001. *TNT*. Maloney B., 2008. *10 Mk 6 Moored Contact Mine* - williammaloney.com. En.wikipedia.org, 2006. *North Sea Mine Barrage*.




Figure 14.—Naval defense mine Mk 2.

Diagram of a Mk 6 Mine


As shown of the picture, the mine has for 4 fuses installed on it and one is deployed with a floater over the mine.

However, as stated previously is the presentation of the topic, we are unable to establish a precise number of mines and precise models. This needs to be discussed and a solution needs to be brought up.

The main problem is that the mines have not been classified as required by International Law. It is only said that these areas are mined, no exact location is given nor exact data. They create an effect of covering a wide range space but are often installed and spread thinly.

It costs about 10% more dollars to remove a mine and can take up to 200 times mores to remove then to install. It is essential to find an effective way to clear the zones as most missions to do so have turned out to be to extensive and expensive for the time being.

When it comes to drones and unmanned vehicles, the following table will give a first grasp of the technology involved. They are UMV (Unmanned Maritime Vehicles) and are rapidly expanding, yet a framework needs to be established in order to meet security requirements and changed military environment.



Department of Defense, 2013²⁵

Source: <https://publicintelligence.net/dod-unmanned-systems-2013/>

²⁵ US Department of Defense, 2013. *Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap*.



For instance: a popular drone is the **Penguin B3 mine hunting drone**: used by the German navy.

Furthermore, another major private group is **ECA Group and its SubSea Program**²⁶ that is described as follows: “Specialized in robotic unmanned systems for very shallow to ultra-deep water applications, ECA Group produces technological solutions to meet the many demands of the constantly evolving Subsea domain. An important aspect of these systems is that they can be “off-the-shelf” as well as designed and manufactured to the customer’s exact specifications.”

3. Missions to clean up the zones

Dynasafe BACTEC Limited²⁷ has been leading clean up missions in the Baltic Sea with unmanned robots²⁸. Dynasafe BACTEC has provided an international risk mitigation service for unexploded ordnance and landmine clearance both on and off shore as a consequence of WWI, WWII and numerous worldwide conflicts; the company has provided services globally in over 50 countries.

How to clean up ?

It takes 2 DAYS to clear up a mine. When the robot finds a mine, a surface ship releases a high-pitched wail to scare away nearby marine mammals, sets off a small explosive to scare away any fish, and then plants and detonates a small charge on the mine.

There are different techniques as follows:

- **Minesweeping**: “Minesweeping is the practice of the removal of explosive naval mines, usually by a specially designed ship called a minesweeper using various measures to either capture or detonate the mines, but sometimes also with an aircraft made for that purpose. “

- **Mine-hunting**: “Specialized high-frequency sonars and high fidelity sidescanning sonar are used for mine location. Mines are hunted using sonar, then inspected and destroyed either by divers or ROVs (remote controlled unmanned mini-submarines).”

²⁶ ECA Group. *Our Subsea Activities*.

²⁷ DYNASAFE, 2015. *Dynasafe BACTEC Limited*.

²⁸ DYNASAFE Area Clearance. *UXO Risk Mitigation*

- **Mine running**: not effective in the situation at hand

4. UN Involvement in mine clearance

The UN intervenes only to advise and assist national authorities or the peacekeeping mission in place in their operations. The United Nations establishes a mine action authority or coordinating center that oversees operations. Mine clearance itself can then be carried out by **national civilian organizations, national or international NGOs, or private contractors.**

The Debate On Drones

Some elements of context:

- Advances in drone technology led to the proliferation of automated systems and heavy reliance of some powers on automated drones;
- Advantages in the use of unmanned/automated drones made it difficult to get any real progress on their regulation till 2024;
- 18 March, 2023: presence of underwater mines confirmed in the Black Sea, origin officially unknown, which led to the intervention of EU and Russian automated mine clearance drones, as requested by the UN;
- May 2023: series of incidents, dubbed the “Black Sea incidents”, between the two fleets of automated drones (e.g. destruction of Russian automated drones caused by detonation of mines by EU drones, and vice versa) which led to tensions between Russia and the EU;
- June 2023: both fleets of automated drones withdrew, replaced by third party mine clearance drones, putting an end to the incident. Mine clearance is still ongoing.
- Deployment of automated mine clearance drones in the Norwegian Sea could lead to another “Black Sea incident episode”, thus furthering the tensions caused by “ROTACS incident”
- The risk of rapid escalation pushes States to convene and discuss on drone regulations, starting with mine-clearance drones, since they need to be deployed ASAP to clear the situation

This Commission’s goal is to lay down rules to prevent any escalations and to prevent any reiteration of the Black Sea incidents. Now is the time to lay the groundwork for efficient drone regulations!

The controversy around drone strikes

The debate on drones of the mid 2010s challenges the idea that drone strikes limit civilian casualties and are a better alternative to conventional operations. However, there is generally not enough information on their impact (whether it be on safeguarding more civilians than conventional strikes, or psychological impact).

April 2015, 2 American citizens tied to Al Qaeda were killed in an US drone strike in Pakistan, further deepening the debate²⁹.

The controversy on drone strike revolved around the ethical implications of their use:

- The dissociation from casualties which could lead to a so-called “Playstation mentality”;
- Make it easier to go into warfare by eliminating the need for ground troops;
- The risk that autonomous systems don’t make the distinction between civilian and military actors;
- The limited oversight of the US Government over drone warfare as of 2015 (official US records of casualties still kept secret for National Security concerns, in spite of UN demands)

On the other hand, resorting to drone strikes reduces military casualties on the user’s part. Such strikes are conducted with higher accuracy compared to conventional weapon strikes, leading to fewer civilian casualties. They are also cheaper.

“We are absolutely ... sowing the seeds for the next round of people to hate us. The next round of terrorists, as we call them within the intelligence community.” Christopher Aaron, Former officer for the CIA’s drone program³⁰

As of July 2016, Obama claimed 116 civilians were killed in US drone strikes³¹ but other sources suggest a much higher number. 474 civilian casualties out of 4,189 according to Foreign Policy³². Furthermore, only 13% of deaths were the intended targets, 81% being other militants and 6% being civilians, according to PIR Center (Russian Center for Policy Research). Such trend was already going on in 2014, as suggest the analysis from human-rights group Reprieve on available data. As of November 2014, attempts to kill 41 men resulted in the deaths of an estimated 1,147 people³³.

²⁹ Mazzetti M., 2015. *Killing of Americans Deepens Debate Over Use of Drone Strikes* - The New York Times.

³⁰ Kupfer D., 2016. *Peace Activists Arrested in Anti-Drone Protests* - The Progressive.

³¹ Ackerman S., 2016. *Obama Claims Us Drones Strikes Have Killed Up To 116 Civilians* - The Guardian.

³² Zenko M., 2016. *Do Not Believe the U.S. Government’s Official Numbers on Drone Strike Civilian Casualties* - Foreign Policy.

³³ Ackerman S., 2014. *41 Men Targeted But 1,147 People Killed: Us Drone Strikes – The Facts On The Ground* - The Guardian.

International Law

During conflicts, weapons systems are subjected to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) that applies. No provision of IHL can be suspended. When not used in armed conflicts, relevant national law and international human right law (IHRL) with its standards on law enforcement applies. Some provisions of IHRL can be suspended under special circumstances (e.g. state of emergency).

Drones are not specifically mentioned in weapon treaties or other legal instruments of international humanitarian law, but their use is. The list includes:

- the necessity of a distinction between military and civilian populations and infrastructure;
- the necessity to maximize precautions to spare civilian populations and civilian infrastructure;
- for each operation, damages on civilians and civilian objects cannot outweigh the military advantages;
- prohibited weapons cannot be carried by drones.

As such, there is nothing on the use of underwater drones per se, which gives Delegates a certain degree of liberty for the beginning of the committee. Considering the current situation around ROTACS, a first step would be to tackle the use of unarmed underwater drones, and move on to other types of drones (armed, airborne...).

From UNODA study on Armed UAVs, 2015³⁴

Drones are classified according to categories: based on physical characteristics such as maximum take-off weight, range, payload, endurance and means of command and control. There are thresholds in existing multilateral export control regimes, but they proved inefficient in regulating the proliferation of all types of armed UAVs.

Preventing the proliferation of underwater armed drones should be a leading priority for delegates. UAVs are already spreading to non-State actors.

³⁴ United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2015. *Study on Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles*.

Questions That Need To Be Tackled In Addressing The Issue

Firstly, delegates must establish what type of mission should be lead, this includes:

- Establishing specific areas
- What technology is involved ?
- Which states are authorized to intervene ?
- UN involvement ?

→ This in order to improve operational capabilities

Secondly, establishing legislation in accordance with international law and the status of drones to oversee the mission. This must meet security requirements and address the changed military environment.

Any legislative background will have an effect on global and humanitarian laws and overall human rights law around the world, this framework must be adapted to present and future combat situations as well.

→ Should there be a database or any form of organ to oversee the use of drones and any questions related to transparency and accountability of the use of Drones and UAVs³⁵? One of the main issues for the time being is the secrecy surrounding the use of drones.

³⁵ International Committee of the Red Cross, 2013. *The Use Of Armed Drones Must Comply With Laws*.



Some Leads

Start with Underwater Drone regulations before tackling the others. Going from less to more sensitive will give you results.

Use past regulations on armaments as sources of inspiration :

- **1921-1922: Washington Naval Conference³⁶** limiting naval arms race

Signatories: US, UK, Japan, France and Italy

- Set ratio of capital ships (respectively 5, 5, 3, 1.67, 1.67)
- Agreed to abandon existing capital-ship building program for 10 years

- **1930: International Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament (First London Naval Treaty³⁷)**

Signatories: US, UK, Japan, France and Italy

Regulated submarine warfare and limited naval shipbuilding

- Restriction on displacement and gun caliber of submarines
- Limited number of heavy cruisers
- Limited tonnage of destroyers
- Applied to submarines same international law as to surface vessels

- **1936: Second London Naval Treaty³⁸**

Signatories: US, UK, France

- Limited maximum size of signatories' ships, and maximum of caliber of guns
- Restricted displacement and gun caliber of submarines
- Same for light cruisers
- Restricted displacement of aircraft carriers

³⁶ En.wikipedia.org, 2004. *Washington Naval Conference*.

³⁷ En.wikipedia.org, 2003. *London Naval Treaty*.

³⁸ En.wikipedia.org, 2003. *Second London Naval Treaty*.

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- **2013: Arms Trade Treaty**³⁹ to regulate international trade in conventional arms.
 - All parties must not authorize arms which would violate the UN Security Council's Chapter VII⁴⁰;
 - break any international treaties or arms embargoes or be used in crimes or attacks against civilians.
 - Importing states must make information about authorization of imports and exports available to exporting states.
 - Transit states or trans-shipment states also have access to relevant information on authorizations in question subject to its national laws, practices and policies.

³⁹ Arms Control Association, 2013. *Arms Trade Treaty*.

⁴⁰ United Nations. *Chapter VII: Action With Respect To Threats To The Peace, Breaches Of The Peace, And Acts Of Aggression*.

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